Saturday, 25 July 2015

Infosec's ability to quantify risk

In Paul Graham's latest post, "Infosec's inability to quantify risk," Graham makes the following claim:
"Infosec isn't a real profession. Among the things missing is proper "risk analysis". Instead of quantifying risk, we treat it as an absolute. Risk is binary, either there is risk or there isn't. We respond to risk emotionally rather than rationally, claiming all risk needs to be removed. This is why nobody listens to us. Business leaders quantify and prioritize risk, but we don't, so our useless advice is ignored."

I'm not going to get into a debate as to the legitimacy of infosec as a profession. My job entails an awful lot of infosec duties, and there are plenty of folks turning a pretty penny in the industry. It's simply not my place to tell people what they can and cannot define as a "profession."

However, I do take issue with the claim that the infosec community lack proper risk analysis tools. We have risk management tools coming out of our ears. We have risk management tools at every level. We have those used at the level of design and implementation, for assessing the risk a vulnerability poses to an organisation, and even tools for analysing risk at an organisational level.

At the design and implementation level, we have software maturity models. Many common ones explicitly include threat modelling and other risk assessment and analysis activities.

One of the explicit aims of the Building Security in Maturity Model (BSIMM) is "Informed risk management decisions." Some activities in the model include "Identify PII obligations" (CP1.2) and "Identify potential attackers" (AM1.3). These are the basic building blocks of risk analysis activities.

The Open Software Assurance Maturity Model (OpenSAMM) follows a similar pattern, including a requirement to "Classify data and applications based on business risk" (SM2) and "Explicitly evaluate risk from third-party components" (TA3).

Finally, the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle requires that users "Use Threat Modelling" to "[...] determine risks from those threats, and establish appropriate mitigations." (SDL Practice #7).

So, we can clearly see that risk analysis is required during the design and implementation of a system. Although no risk management methodology is prescribed by the maturity models, it's easy to see that we're clearly in an ecosystem that's not only acutely aware of risk, but also the way those risks will impact organisational objectives.

If these maturity models fail to produce adequately secure software, we need to understand how bad a vulnerability is. Put simply, statements like "On the scale of 1 to 10, this is an 11" are not useful. I understand why such statements are sometimes necessary, but I worry about the media becoming fatigued.

Vulnerabilities are classified using one of several methods. Off the top of my head, I can think of three:
  1. Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
  2. DREAD Risk Assessment Model (Wikipedia)
  3. STRIDE (Wikipedia)
These allow for those with infosec duties to roughly determine the risk that a vulnerability may pose to their organisation. Put simply, they allow for the assessment of the risk posed to one's systems. They are a (blunt) tool for risk assessment.

Finally, there are whole-organisation mechanisms for managing risks, which are often built into an Information Security Management System (ISMS). One of the broadest ISMS standards is BS ISO/IEC 27001:2013, which states:
"The organization shall define and apply an information security risk assessment process [...]"
If this seems a bit general, you should be aware that an example of a risk management process (which includes mechanisms for risk assessment & analysis) is available in BS ISO/IEC 27005:2011.

Let's look at the CERT Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) Allegro technical report:
"OCTAVE Allegro is a methodology to streamline and optimize the process of assessing information security risks [...]"
Similarly, Appendix A provides guidance on risk management, which includes sections on risk assessment and analysis.

Yet another standard is NIST SP800-30 Revision 1, "Guide for Conducting
Risk Assessments". It states it's purpose quite clearly in section 1.1 "Purpose and Applicability"
"The purpose of Special Publication 800-30 is to provide guidance for conducting risk assessments [...]"
NIST SP800-30 Revision 1 also provides an example of how to conduct a risk assessment.

As you can see, members of the infosec community have quite a few tools for risk assessment and analysis at our finger-tips. From the design and implementation of software, through to the assessment of individual vulnerabilities, and even for assessing, analysing, and mitigating organisational risk, we're well equipped.

The infosec community is often very bad at communicating, and the media likes a salacious story. How often have you heard that a cure for cancer has been found, sight returned to the blind, and teleportation achieved? Recently, members of the infosec community have played into this, but that does not eliminate the fact that we do have tools for proper risk management. Our field is not so naive that we blindly believe all risk to be unacceptable.

Sunday, 7 June 2015

The Four Words of Distress

The title of this post is taken directly from The Codeless Code, "The Four Words of Distress"

I read it again yesterday, and today I have been bitten by it.

I accidentally removed the content of a comment on this blog. I don't get many comments, so I feel that all of them are important contributions (except the incessant 50 Shades of Grey spam, urgh, do I regret writing about that.) As such, removing a comment is "serious" to me.

Upon realising my error, I immediately searched the page for an undo or a "restore" link of some sort, and eventually went to search for an answer to my problems. I only found unanswered questions on Google's Groups, and a Product Help page claiming that I should've been sent to a confirmation page (no such thing happened)

To have fixed this problem, there would have been any number of ways to deal with it:


  1. A confirmation dialogue, alongside a "don't show this again" check box.
  2. A trash can, which comments can go to for a fixed period of time.
  3. An undo button
  4. A help guide.
As it stands, I accidentally clicked the "Remove Content" link, and now, without warning, the comment has gone. I worry that this is a black mark against the commenter's account, when it is a simple mistake.

Saturday, 6 June 2015

Chrooting a Mumble Server on OpenBSD

One of my colleagues is starting remote working shortly. As such, we needed a VoIP solution that worked for everyone, Mac, Linux and FreeBSD. It was discovered that Mumble provided ample quality and worked everywhere. Top it off with the fact that we could host it ourselves, and we looked to be set.

However, being security conscious, I like to sandbox any service I have. Further, since this solution is slightly ad-hoc at the moment, it's being run off a personal BigV server, running OpenBSD. So I set out to chroot the package-managed mumble server, umurmur, which does not include sandboxing as default.

Fortunately, if no logfile is specified, umurmurd will log to syslog, and it does not support config reloading, so I don't need to worry about that.

Chrooting is not entirely simple, and simple versions can be improved by "refreshing" the chroot every time the service starts. This means that if an attacker infects the binary in some way, it'll get cleared out and replaced after a restart. As another bonus, if a shared library is updated, it simply won't get found, which tells you what to update! If the binary gets updated, it'll be copied in fresh when the service is restarted.

To do this, we modify /etc/rc.d/umurmur:


#!/bin/sh
#
# $OpenBSD: umurmurd.rc,v 1.2 2011/07/08 09:09:43 dcoppa Exp $
#
# 2015-06-06, Turner:
#
# Jails the umurmurd deamon on boot, copies the daemon binary and
# libraries in each time.
#
# An adversary can still tamper with the logfiles, but everything
# else is transient.
#

chroot="/var/jails/umurmurd"
group="_umurmur"
original_daemon="/usr/local/bin/umurmurd"
daemon="chroot $chroot $original_daemon"

build_chroot() {
  # Locations of binaries and libraries.
  mkdir -p "$chroot/usr/local/bin"
  mkdir -p "$chroot/usr/lib"
  mkdir -p "$chroot/usr/local/lib"
  mkdir -p "$chroot/usr/libexec"

  # Copy in the binary.
  cp "$original_daemon" "$chroot/usr/local/bin/"

  # Copy in shared libraries
  cp "/usr/lib/libssl.so.27.0" "$chroot/usr/lib/"
  cp "/usr/lib/libcrypto.so.30.0" "$chroot/usr/lib/"
  cp "/usr/local/lib/libconfig.so.9.2" "$chroot/usr/local/lib/"
  cp "/usr/local/lib/libprotobuf-c.so.0.0" "$chroot/usr/local/lib/"
  cp "/usr/lib/libc.so.77.0" "$chroot/usr/lib/"
  cp "/usr/libexec/ld.so" "$chroot/usr/libexec/ld.so"

  # Setup /etc and copy in config.
  mkdir -p "$chroot/etc/umurmur"
  cp "/etc/umurmur/umurmur.conf" "$chroot/etc/umurmur/umurmur.conf"
  cp "/etc/umurmur/certificate.crt" "$chroot/etc/umurmur/certificate.conf"
  cp "/etc/umurmur/private_key.key" "$chroot/etc/umurmur/private_key.key"

  # Setup the linker hints.
  mkdir -p "$chroot/var/run/"
  cp "/var/run/ld.so.hints" "$chroot/var/run/ld.so.hints"
  cp "/usr/libexec/ld.so" "$chroot/usr/libexec/ld.so"

  # Copy the pwd.db password database in. This is less-than-ideal.
  cp "/etc/pwd.db" "$chroot/etc/"
  grep "$group" "/etc/group" > "$chroot/etc/group"

  # Setup /dev
  mkdir "$chroot/dev"
  mknod -m 644 "$chroot/dev/urandom" c 1 9
  mknod -m 644 "$chroot/dev/null" c 1 3
}

destroy_chroot() {
  if [ "$chroot" ]
  then
    rm -rf "$chroot"
  fi
}

case "$1" in
  start)
    build_chroot
    ;;
  stop)
    destroy_chroot
    ;;
esac
# Standard rc.d "stuff" here.
. /etc/rc.d/rc.subr

rc_reload=NO

rc_cmd $1

So there we go! When /etc/rc.d/umurmurd start is called, the chroot is setup, and umurmurd started in there. When you kill it, the chroot jail is emptied.

There are some limitations. For one, any private key (in the default, it's private_key.key) can be compromised by an attacker who can compromise umurmurd, and this can be used to impersonate the server long after the compromise. Secondly, if you do specify a log file in umurmur.conf, and you setup the relevant directory for logging to, it will be trashed when you stop the daemon. This is a real problem if you're trying to workout what happened during a compromise.

Finally, if umurmur is updated, and the required libraries do change, "ldd /usr/local/bin/umurmurd" will list the new shared objects.

Known Issues

This does not currently stop the umurmur daemon on stop. I'm not entirely sure why, but the work around is to stop the service using /etc/rc.d/umurmurd stop, then find it using ps A | grep umurmur and kill -15 it.

Sunday, 31 May 2015

Refactoring & Reliability

We rely on so many systems that their reliability is becoming more and more important.

Pay bonuses are determined based on the output of performance review systems; research grants handed out based on researcher tracking systems, and entire institutions may put their faith for visa enforcement in yet more systems.

The failure of these systems can lead to distress, financial loss, the closure of the organisations, or even prosecution. Clearly, we want these systems to have a low failure rate; be they design flaws or implementation defects.

Unfortunately for the developers of the aforementioned systems, the all have a common (serious) problem: the business rules around them are often in flux. Therefore, the systems must have the dual property of flexibility and reliability. Very often, these are in contradiction to one another.

Reliability requires requirements, specification, design, test suites, design and code review, change control, monitoring, and many other processes to prevent, detect, and recover from failures in the system. Each step in the process is designed as a filter to deal with certain kinds of failures. Without them, these failures can start creeping into a production system. These filters also reduce the agility of a team; reducing their capability to respond to new opportunities and changing business rules.

On the other hand, the flexibility demanded by the team's environment is often attained through the use of traditional object-orientated design. This is typically achieved by writing to specific design patterns. If a system is not already in a state that is considered to be "good design," a team will apply refactorings.

Refactorings are small, semantics-preserving changes to the source of a system, with the goal of migrating towards a better design. This sounds perfect. Any analysis and testing which took place prior to the refactoring should still be valid! [1].
However, even though the semantics of the source are preserved (although, humans do occasionally make mistakes!), other observable properties of the program are not preserved. Any formal argument that was made regarding the correctness, or time, space or power requirements may not be valid after the refactoring.

Not only does the refactoring undermine any previous formal argument, it can often make it more difficult to construct a new argument for the new program. This is because many of the refactoring techniques given introduce additional indirection, duplicate loops, or use dynamically allocated objects. These are surprisingly difficult to deal with in a formal argument. So much so that many safety-critical environments simply do not support them, for example, SPARKAda. In many common standards aimed at safety critical systems, they are likewise banned.

I am not arguing against refactoring. I think it's a great tool to have in one's toolbox. I also think that like any other tool, it needs to be used carefully and with prior thought. I'd also shy away from the idea that just because something's important, it is critical. With a suitable development process, a development team can remain agile whilst still reducing the risk of a serious failure to an acceptable level.

In the end, it's exactly that -- the balance of risks. If a team is not responsive, they may miss out on significant opportunities.To mitigate this risk, teams introduce flexibility into their code through refactoring. To mitigate the risk of these refactorings causing a serious failure [2], the team should employ other mitigations, for example, unit and integration testing, design and code review, static analysis, and so on. Ideally, to maintain the team's agility, they should be as automated and integrated into their standard development practice as possible. Each team and project is different, so they would need to assess which processes best mitigate the risks, whilst maintaining that flexibility and agility.


[1] Fowler states that for refactorings to be "safe", you should have (as a minimum) comprehensive unit tests.
[2] Assuming that the "original" system wasn't going to cause a serious failure regardless.

Saturday, 11 April 2015

All White Labour?

With the up and coming general election, we've been receiving election material.

When my other half mentioned that the leaflet we received from the Labour candidate for York Central looked a little bit "overly white" (paraphrasing), I  decided to run the numbers.

The York Unitary Authority's demographics, from the 2011 census show that we have 94.3% "white" people [1].

We sat down and counted the faces on the leaflet, excluding the candidate themselves. We came to a count of 14 faces, all of which were white.

The chance of picking 14 people at random from a population which is 94.3% white and getting 14 white people is 43.97%. That means that the chance of getting at least one non-white person on the leaflet would've been 56.03%.

Obviously, this is quite close to a toss-up, but bear in mind that these people aren't usually selected for at random. All sorts of biases go into selecting people for photo shoots, from who turns out, to who interacts with the candidate, who the photographer chooses to take photographs of and who is selecting which photos from the shoots end up on the page and their biases towards what will "look good," and what is expected to promote an image of diversity.

Anyways, I don't want to say one way or the other about what this does or does not mean, I just want the data to be available for people.

References:

[1] : 2011 Census: KS201EW Ethnic group, local authorities in England and Wales (Excel sheet 335Kb) (http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?newquery=*&newoffset=0&pageSize=25&edition=tcm%3A77-286262) Accessed: 2015-04-11

Monday, 6 April 2015

OpenBSD time_t Upgrade

Last night I foolishly undertook the upgrade from 5.4 to 5.5, without properly reading the documentation. My login shell is zsh, which meant that, when the upgrade was complete, I couldn't login to my system.

I'd get to the login prompt, enter my credentials, see the motd, and be kicked out as zsh crashed, due to the change from 32-bit time_t to 64-bit time_t change. I'd also taken the security precaution of locking the root account.

If fixed this as follows:

  1. Reboot into single-user mode (boot -s at the boot> prompt)
  2. Mounted my filesystems (they all needed fsck running on them, before mount -a)
  3. Changed my login shell to /bin/sh (chsh -s /bin/sh <<username>>)
  4. Rebooted.
After that, it was a simple question of logging in and doing the usual; update my PKG_PATH to point at a 5.4 mirror, and running "pkg_add -u" to upgrade all my affected packages.

I then continued on to upgrade my system to OpenBSD 5.5.

A quick warning: This is one particular failure mode arising from not reading the docs. It may get you back into your system, but it's unlikely to fix all your woes if you don't read the docs.

So, the moral of the story is: ALWAYS READ THE DOCS.

Monday, 16 February 2015

Keeping a Web Service Secure

This post is aimed at those tasked with developing and maintaining a secure system, but who have not had to do so previously. It is primarily a sign-posting exercise, pointing initiates in the right direction. It is not gospel; many things require common sense, and there is rarely a right answer. Everything is a trade off; performance for security, usability for development time, backup size for recovery ability. To do this effectively, you need to consider your systems as a whole, including the people running and building them.

Keeping a web service adequately secure is quite a task. Many of the things covered will simply not apply, depending on your business model. For instance, web services which use services such as Google App Engine, Heroku, or OpenShift will not need to keep up with OS patches. Those that are for intranet use only may be able to get away with weaker password policies if they're not usually exposed to the internet.

Use your common sense, but be prepared to backup your decisions with evidence. When the executioner comes, you need to be able to honestly argue that you did the right thing, given the circumstances. If you can't do this honestly, you will get found out, your failure will be compounded, and the outcomes all the more severe.

The whole aim of these recommendations is to give you a head start removing potential avenues of attack for your adversaries, providing some mitigation to recover from an attack, and giving you plenty of places to go do further research.

You'll need to do the basics for securing your infrastructure. As with most other things, this is an ongoing process.

You will likely need, as a bare minimum, a properly configured firewall. I'm a big fan of pf, but IPTables is probably more widely used. Use what's appropriate for your platform, do some reading, and make sure you've got it dropping as much un-necessary traffic as possible, in and out of your organisation.

For remote access, most services go with SSH. OpenSSH is easily hardened. I'd recommend having a good read of Lucas' SSH Mastery to familiarise yourself with the finer points of the service. If your platform doesn't have SSH, it's likely that you'll have something similar, but you'll have to do your research.

If your company has more than a small handful of employees, sudo is an absolute life saver. Once again, Lucas provides a good book on utilising sudo for access control & auditing in Sudo Mastery.

You must keep any services you run up to date. This is everything, database, web server, remote access, kernel, etc. This will entail some downtime. A little and often goes a long way towards preventing major outages.

Often, people have perfectly good intentions, but fail to keep up with patches. There are three main causes.

The first is wanting to avoid any and all scheduled downtime. If you plan correctly, and notify your users ahead of time, this is no issue. People largely don't mind the service disappearing at a well-known time for an hour a month.

The second is harder to combat. Ignorance of the updates existence, the security implications of not applying the patch, or knowledge of how to apply them. You need to collate a list of your dependencies (web servers, databases, OS patches, etc.) and their security announcement pages. This list then needs to be checked, and any relevant issues assessed. You should also be aware of how you actually update each piece of software. Many operating systems from the unix family make this easy with a package manager, but I don't know how the rest of the computing world fares in that arena.

Typically, Mitre will provide an assessment of the risk posed to organisations by a vulnerability, which is normally a reasonable estimate of the risk posed to your organisation. High risk vulnerabilities may need re-mediation outside your normal downtime cycle, lower risk ones may be able to wait.

The third is that many people fear updates as they can break things. This risk only gets worse with time. If you're not keeping up with the latest security patches, then when things break, you need to work out which of the 17 patches you just applied did it. With just one or two patches, you can file a bug report, or determine if you're mis-using the dependency much more easily.

A hidden set of dependencies are those of your own bespoke software, which are pulled in by some form of build process. Many organisations simply ignore is the dependencies of their bespoke software. For instance, with a large Java application, it's all too easy to get left behind when ORMs and IoCs get updated regularly. You must be regularly checking your dependencies of your bespoke software for updates, and the same arguments regarding OS level patching apply. Get too far behind, and you'll get bitten -- hard.

I'd recommend turning on OS-level exploit mitigation techniques provided by your OS. This is typically things like address-space layout randomisation (ASLR) and W^X, but plenty of others exist. Should you be on holiday when a problem arises, these will buy you some time to either put a phone call in to someone to get the ball rolling, or get to an internet cafe and open a connection with a one-time password (don't trust the internet cafe!). They also tend to frustrate attackers, and may prevent some specific vulnerabilities from being exploitable at all.

This is a huge field, and some systems don't have all of these protections turned on by default, or simply lack the feature at all. Look very closely at your OS, and the dials that you can turn up.

Other systems of policy enforcement, such as SELinux may also help, but I've not had much chance to use them. Read up on them, both pros and cons, and work out if they're of much use to you, and if they're worth your time.

The next class of problems is running obviously bad software. Even if you keep your dependencies up to date, lots of people will fall prey to this. One of the worst offenders is WordPess (and it's plugin ecosystem), but other system have not had a clean run.

Check out the history of a project before utilising it. If you've decided that it's bad, but nothing else works for you, segregate, segregate, segregate. Then monitor it for when it does get compromised. This can be done with a simple chroot, or for beefier solutions, a separate system with an aggressive firewall between it and any user data can help. For monitoring, you'll probably want something like Nagios, but there's plenty of alternatives.

If possible, you should try to segregate and monitor your bespoke software as if it were in the class of services with a poor history, but this may not be possible.

On the subject of monitoring, you should be monitoring lots of performance metrics, such as database load, queries per second, errors/second in logs, etc. These will help tell if you something funny (security related or otherwise) is up, before it becomes a major problem for you.

You may also chose to deploy an intrusion detection system (IDS). Snort is widely recommended, and comes with a whole bunch of basic rules. You'll need to tune this to filter out the noise and leave the signal. This is no small task, prepare yourself for some serious documentation divin' with most IDS/

Once you're at this point, you should be have a relatively decent security posture. But there's two crucial things I've not covered, relating to recovery from an incident.

The first is backups. Make them, store the offline (at least one business has gone under from this), and test them, and your restore processes regularly. If something bad happens, you need these to be out of reach of the threat, whether it's deliberate or otherwise.

Secondly is general incident response. However, the one I'd most like to bring to the fore is a breach communications package. This is a set of templates covering several scenarios which can be used to notify customers, fend off the press, and put on your website to explain the situation. If you're a big company, and you expose customer data, the press will call. If you expose a lot of user data, the press will call. If you are compromised by a highly news-worthy adversary (e.g. ISIL), the press will call.

Do not waste your time trying to talk to journalists, and do not waste time writing a press release under pressure. You'll do a bad job of it, and things will go from bad to worse very quickly; especially if reporters think you're available for comment.

And finally, what's the point of all this, if you're not going to be developing some bad-ass web app to scratch a particular itch.

I strongly recommend that you use some variety of a secure development lifecycle, such as OpenSAMM, BSIMM, or Microsoft's SDL. Obviously, these won't solve your issues, but they should help alleviate them.

One of the most important things on each lifecycle is developer training. Without that, you're leaving a very large, obvious and attractive target for attackers.

Many of the things in a lifecycle will overlap with, and go beyond these recommendations. That's good and fine, but most of them discuss things in very abstract terms, and hopefully this post puts some of the requirements down more concretely.

Hopefully, that should give you a good place to start. The important thing is discipline. The discipline to check for & apply patches, follow a secure development lifecycle, impose some reasonable restrictions on yourself and therefore your attackers.

Developing software is very hard. Developing secure software is maddeningly hard. For this reason, there is no security silver bullet. Anyone trying to sell you a one-stop solution is full of it. It requires careful research and implementation; and it will take time. It is easiest to do this from the start, but by injecting quality control activities into an existing process, you can begin to improve an organisation's security posture, but it will be slow. In many cases, bespoke software will have to be reviewed or simply thrown away, services migrated to better-configured infrastructure, and so on. It takes time, a lot of time.